Real-Exchange-Rate-Adjusted Inflation Targeting in an Open Economy: Some Analytical Results by Froyen, R.T. & Guender, A.V.
   
 
 
 
Volume 35, Issue 4
 
Real-Exchange-Rate-Adjusted Inflation Targeting in an Open Economy: Some
Analytical Results
 
Richard T Froyen 
University of North Carolina
Alfred V Guender 
University of Canterbury
Abstract
Under optimal policy from a timeless perspective, a central bank targeting an inflation measure which is adjusted for
changes in the real exchange rate (REX inflation) has the ability to stabilize the output gap and inflation against
demand disturbances in an open economy. This distinct advantage is lost if a central bank follows a Taylor-type rule.
The bank has an incentive to add the real exchange rate to the Taylor rule because it duplicates the performance of the
optimal policy for portfolio shocks. The Taylor-type rule becomes a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) that
outperforms Taylor-type rules which accord no weight at all or a higher weight to the real exchange rate. In the current
environment of concern about sudden increases in U.S. interest rates, the properly designed MCI would have a
considerable advantage.
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1. Introduction 
 
 Policymakers in small open economies around the world are increasingly concerned 
about the undesirable consequences of sudden increases in U.S. interest rates. This paper 
demonstrates that in a small open economy a central bank can successfully ward off sudden 
changes in foreign interest rates and risk premium shocks – portfolio shocks - by choosing a 
core rate of inflation, real-exchange-rate-adjusted (REX) inflation, as its inflation objective 
and adding the real exchange rate to a Taylor-type rule. 1 The Taylor-type rule with a 
prescribed exchange rate response becomes a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI). From a 
welfare perspective the Taylor-type rule, with (the MCI) or without the exchange rate 
response, delivers welfare losses that are substantially greater than under optimal policy with 
commitment. But the performance of the properly designed MCI relative to other Taylor type 
rules improves with portfolio shocks becoming a more important source of disturbances. 
 
2. Model for a Small Open Economy 
The open economy model is a variant of the New Keynesian type:                     (       )    (         )           (1)             (            )    (         )    ቀ           ቁ             (2)                        +                                         (3) 
   
             
                  (4)  
 
t  the rate of domestic inflation  
CPI1ttE 
 
the expected rate of CPI inflation 
tq
 
the real exchange rate  
ty =  the output gap 
tR  the nominal rate of interest (policy instrument) 
ftR
 
the foreign nominal rate of interest 
f 1ttE   the expected foreign rate of inflation 
                                                 
1 REX inflation is similar to the modified inflation measure suggested by Ball (1999) in the open-economy 
context. 
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f
ty =  the foreign output gap 
Lower case variables represent logarithms. All parameters are positive. The discount 
factor   is less than or equal to one.  γ denotes consumption openness:        We treat 
all foreign variables as exogenous random variables that are independent of each other. All 
shocks are white noise processes with constant variance.  
 Equation (1) represents an open economy Phillips curve. It is derived from an 
optimizing framework where price-setting domestic firms respond not only to changes in 
marginal cost but also to foreign price and exchange rate induced changes in their 
competiveness vis-à-vis foreign firms. The “competitiveness effect” results in a direct real 
exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve which complicates the formulation of optimal 
monetary policy.2  Equation (2) is an open economy IS relation while the Uncovered Interest 
Rate Parity (UIP) condition is given by equation (3). Equation (4) represents the relationship 
between CPI inflation, domestic inflation and the real exchange rate under complete 
exchange rate pass-through. 
3. Flexible Real-Exchange-Rate-Adjusted (REX) Inflation Targeting: Optimal 
Policy under Commitment3 
  
 An inflation measure which can serve as a central bank’s inflation target in an open 
economy is domestic inflation stripped of the effects of changes in the real exchange rate: 
REX inflation. The REX inflation measure is similar to Ball’s (1999) modified inflation 
measure. His measure, which he argues is “similar in spirit to calculations of ‘core’ or 
‘underlying’ inflation by central banks”, also strips away transitory exchange rate effects.4 As 
shown below, the rationale for choosing REX inflation derives from its attractive stabilizing 
properties in the face of demand-driven shocks. Defining 
    
REX
t t t t
π π bȋq q Ȍ   1
     (5) 
                                                 
2 With the exception of equation (1) the model conforms to the standard open economy New Keynesian 
framework proposed by Gali and Monacelli (2005). In Gali and Monacelli (2005) firms set domestic prices as a 
mark-up over marginal cost only. The effect of competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign firms receives support from 
surveys [Greenslade and Parker (2012)] as well as from micro data [Brunn and Ellis (2012a), (2012b)]. The 
derivation of the open economy Phillips curve is explained in greater detail in Froyen and Guender (2014). 
Phillips curves with distinct exchange rate channels feature also in Ball (1999) and Svensson (2000). 
3 The formation of optimal monetary policy is described in the context of a linear-quadratic framework which is 
rather standard in the New Keynesian literature (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2011) for a closed 
economy and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), Gali and Monacelli (2005) for an open economy).  
4  Ball’s (1999) definition of “long-run inflation” in a simple backward-looking framework involves the level 
and not the change of the real exchange rate. 
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as the domestic rate of inflation purged of the real exchange rate effect allows us to rewrite 
the original open-economy Phillips curve as 
    
REX REX
t t t t t
π βE π κy u  1 .     (6) 
Except for the definition of the rate of inflation, equation (6) corresponds to the standard 
closed-economy Phillips curve where policy exerts its effect on inflation only through the 
output gap channel. As such neither the open-economy IS nor the UIP relation acts a binding 
constraint under optimal policy. 
 The central bank’s objective is to stabilize the output gap and REX inflation.5 Under 
optimal policy from a timeless perspective, the central bank minimizes the squared deviations 
from target in both target variables: 
 
 
 
 
               ∑                         (7) 
    
 subject to  
    
REX REX
t t t t t
π βE π κy u  1
 
 Barring the definition of the rate of inflation, the resulting target rule is the same as in 
the closed economy: 
    
REX
t t t
y y μκπ   1 0       (8) 
 This is the celebrated result according to which optimal monetary policy in an open 
economy is isomorphic to that in a closed economy. It implies that 
i. only a cost-push shock dislodges the output gap and REX inflation from 
their respective target levels; 
ii. the central bank can shield both the output gap and REX inflation from the 
effects of both domestic and foreign disturbances arising in the goods 
market as well as portfolio shocks. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Ideally, the central bank maximizes the expected utility of a representative household. In this context, 
Kirsanova et al (2006) show that the objective function of a central bank must include not only the output gap 
and domestic inflation but also the real exchange rate (or terms of trade). By choosing REX inflation as a target 
variable, the central bank mitigates this concern. The target level for REX inflation is set to zero. 
4 
 
4. The Stabilizing Properties of a Taylor-Type Rule 
   Optimal policy is often dismissed as being infeasible. A prescriptive rule for 
monetary policy commonly used in policy analysis is a Taylor-type rule. While ad hoc in its 
conception a Taylor-type rule has considerable appeal because of its inherent simplicity and 
its robustness in a wide variety of macroeconomic models.6   
 In this section we evaluate Taylor-type rules in a small open economy where the 
central bank targets REX inflation. Our analysis addresses the following issues: 
 How do Taylor-type rules compare to optimal policy? 
 Should the rule respond to the real exchange rate? 
 If so, what is the appropriate weight on the real exchange rate? 
The specification of the Taylor-type rule takes the following form: 
 
                      (9)     policy parameter chosen by the central bank; i =        
The central bank adjusts the policy setting in response to movements in REX inflation, 
the output gap, and, if warranted, the level of the real exchange rate.7 
4.1 Optimal Policy versus Taylor-Type Rules: A Theoretical Assessment 
 Combining equations (1) – (4) with equation (8) and equation (9), respectively, yields 
the solutions for the variables of the model under optimal policy from a timeless perspective 
and a Taylor-type rule. The analytical solutions appear in Table I.  
 Inspection of the results in the bottom half of Table I confirms that under optimal 
policy both target variables are fully insulated from demand-side shocks and are displaced 
only by a cost-push disturbance.8 
 The top half of the table shows the stabilization response of the four endogenous 
variables under a Taylor-type rule. It is evident that REX inflation and the output gap are 
susceptible to all shocks of the model. The inferior stabilization response of a Taylor-type 
rule relative to optimal policy comes about because the policy instrument cannot respond 
                                                 
6  See the Taylor (ed) (1999) volume on Monetary Policy Rules. 
7 For the two target variables and the real exchange rate the respective target level is zero. 
8 To save space, we do not report the solutions for the policy instrument and the real exchange rate.  
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directly to the shocks of the model.9 A close look at the coefficients on the shocks reveals 
further why a Taylor rule that responds arbitrarily to real exchange rate movements may lead 
to inferior stabilization outcomes compared to a conventional Taylor rule. First, adding the 
real exchange rate to a Taylor rule worsens the stabilization response of both target variables 
to demand-side disturbances. The response parameter    appears in both the numerator and 
denominator of the coefficient on all demand-side disturbances in the solution for the output 
gap and REX inflation. For demand-side shocks, best stabilization of both target variables 
under a Taylor type rule is achieved if       Second, for REX inflation a distorted 
stabilization response occurs also in case of a cost-push shock if the real exchange rate 
appears in a Taylor-type rule, i.e. if     . The only gain (for the target variables) from 
adding the real exchange rate to the instrument rule is better output gap stabilization in the 
wake of a cost-push shock. If REX inflation rises because of a cost-push shock, the ensuing 
appreciation of the real exchange rate implies that the monetary tightening necessary to bring 
inflation to heel need be less severe. The real exchange rate response softens the impact of 
the cost-push shock and leads to a smaller contraction of the output gap. This is clearly 
evident in Table I:    appears only in the denominator of the coefficient on the cost-push 
shock in the solution for the output gap.  
4.2 The Real Exchange Rate as a Stabilization Tool 
 The foregoing analysis shows that a Taylor-type rule that provides for an arbitrary 
real exchange rate response can be problematic for stabilization policy in an open economy. 
In this section attention focuses on whether a central bank can make the policy instrument 
respond to the real exchange rate so as to nullify the effect of disturbances.   
 Inspection of the coefficient on        in the top half of Table I makes it clear that a 
central bank can engineer an optimal response to portfolio shocks. By choosing              , the central bank can shield the output gap and REX inflation from this source of 
disturbance. Adopting this setting for   amounts to following a special Monetary Conditions 
Index where the relative weight on the real exchange rate is composed of the ratio of two 
demand-side parameters adjusted for the degree of openness in the Phillips curve and 
consumption openness.10  
                                                 
9 Svensson (2003) makes this point in a closed-economy context.  
10 Previous investigations of MCIs are by Ball (1999) and Gerlach and Smets (2000). 
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4.3 Flexible REX Inflation Targeting under Taylor-Type Rules11 
To measure overall performance, we examine the stabilizing properties of four 
specifications of a Taylor-type rule, each of which assigns a specific weight (ranging from 0 
to 0.5) to the real exchange rate. A standard loss function consisting of the weighted 
variances of REX inflation and the output gap is used to gauge the performance of each 
Taylor-type rule. To complete the analysis, we compare the performance of the Taylor type 
rules to the benchmark case of optimal policy from a timeless perspective. 
The variances of all endogenous variables appear in Table II. The numerical 
evaluation of the performance of the four Taylor-type rules suggests that the MCI (rule (2)), 
which accords a very low weight (0.0333) to the real exchange rate, produces the lowest loss 
score at 1.8197. The differences in performance among the four specifications are minute if 
each shock has unit variance.12 A striking difference, however, exists between the loss scores 
of the Taylor-type rules and the loss score of optimal policy from a timeless perspective. The 
bottom row of Table II records welfare losses for the Taylor-type rules (vis-à-vis optimal 
policy) ranging from 99.3% to 102.2%.  As explained in Section 2, under optimal policy, the 
central bank can shield both REX inflation and the output gap from IS, foreign output, and 
portfolio shocks by aggressive use of the policy instrument. A Taylor-type rule can at best 
protect both target variables from portfolio shocks if a central bank follows an MCI. The 
performance of the MCI relative to the other Taylor-type rules listed in Table II improves 
further with portfolio shocks becoming the dominant source of disturbances (e.g. for            and the variances of all other shocks remaining unity). 
5. Conclusion 
 In an open economy where the central bank practices flexible REX inflation targeting 
welfare losses from following a Taylor-type rule relative to optimal policy are substantial. 
These losses arise primarily because a Taylor-type rule cannot stabilize the output gap as well 
as optimal policy. There is a gain from including the real exchange rate in a Taylor-type rule 
as such a rule (MCI) offers the central bank the opportunity to fashion a response to the real 
                                                 
11 Earlier contributions that have studied Taylor-type rules are Ball (1999), Taylor (2001), Batini et al (2003), 
to name but a few. We use representative values for the model parameters, policy and preference parameters as 
well as the variances of the shocks to compute the variances of the endogenous variables. See the bottom of 
Table II for further details. 
12 The main focus here is on overall performance rather than individual variables. The variance of the real 
exchange rate is considerably higher than the variance of the policy instrument due to the acute sensitivity of the 
real exchange rate to portfolio shocks.  
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exchange rate which eliminates the effect of a portfolio shock on both REX inflation and the 
output gap. The optimal weight on the real exchange rate is small but the welfare gains from 
its inclusion in the rule increase with the importance of portfolio shocks relative to the other 
shocks. In view of the uncertainty about the future path of monetary policy in the US, this 
advantage is considerable. 
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 Table I: Taylor-Type Rule with Response to Real Exchange Rate and Optimal Policy from a Timeless Perspective 
                  
 Taylor-Type Rule:                      
     (      )       (          )(      ) 
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Timeless Perspective 
                           
0 
 
                        
 
        0 
 
                             
 
 Note:             √                     
  
 
Table II: Evaluating Taylor-Type Rules 
 
Definitions: 
Taylor Rule:                    
MCI:                                  
Loss =                        
Welfare Loss =                                x = (1), (2), (3), (4).  
Numerical Values:  
Parameters:                                                   .                       
The variance of each shock is 1.   
  
 
 
 
       (1) 
Taylor Rule 
         (2)   
       MCI 
 
 
      (3) 
Taylor Rule 
+             (4) Taylor Rule +      Timeless Perspective 
    (TP) 
 V(y) 0.9193 0.9150 0.9053 0.9167 0.0456 
V(πREX) 0.9023 0.9047 0.9181 0.9300 0.8675 
V(R) 1.5963 1.5261 1.2046 1.0161 5.0124 
V(q) 2.9496 2.8169 2.1377 1.6202 5.8572 
Loss 1.8216 1.8197 1.8233 1.8467 0.9131 
Welfare Loss 99.5% 99.3% 99.7% 102.2%      - 
